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ABSTRACT 
Separate lines of research show that individuals: a) understand immorality metaphorically as 
physical contamination; b) project undesirable self-attributes onto others; and c) view 
punishment as eliminating a transgressor’s immorality. Integrating these findings, we 
hypothesized that individuals project guilt over their own immoral actions – experienced as 
physical contamination – onto another transgressor wh se punishment restores their own 
perceived moral and physical purity. Study 1 showed that priming participants’ own immoral 
actions decreased their felt physical cleanliness, but not if they were presented with a punished 
transgressor. Study 2 showed that participants primed with their own immoral actions viewed 
another transgressor as physically dirtier as a result of their own increased feelings of guilt. 
Additionally, the subsequent punishment of the contaminated transgressor restored participants’ 
perceived personal morality and eliminated their desire to engage in moral restoration behavior. 
These studies are the first to show that another’s punishment can serve to “cleanse” the self.  
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Another Wrongdoer’s Punishment Cleanses the Self: Evidence for a Moral Cleansing Function 
of Punishing Moral Transgressors 
Members of many pre-modern cultures regularly participated in “rituals of purification” 
in which a target individual or non-human animal was punished to restore the community’s 
moral purity (Victor, 2003). For instance, ancient Israelites placed their sins onto a goat that was 
exiled to expunge their guilt (Allport, 1954/1979), while the Greeks stoned criminals burdened 
with the transgressions of others in order to remove the community’s immorality (Frazer, 
1922/2002). Although these purification practices differ in superficial respects, they are all based 
on three interrelated beliefs: immorality exists as a tangible contaminant; it can be transferred 
from the self to others; and it can be eliminated by punishing those “contaminated” others 
(Douglas, 1995).  
Although these beliefs may sound archaic to modern ea s, separate lines of research show 
that they continue to shape people’s thinking about morality: people understand immorality 
metaphorically as a tangible contaminant (Rozin, Lowery, & Ebert, 1994); they project undesired 
aspects of the self onto others (Schimel, Greenberg, & Martens, 2003); and they view 
punishment as a means of expiating the moral transges ions of the punished (Bastian, Jetten & 
Fasoli, 2011). Integrating and extending these findings, we hypothesized that individuals 
continue to believe that the punishment of other transgressors can serve to atone for their own 
immoral actions.  
The current studies are the first to assess this hypot esis experimentally. Study 1 tests 
whether a salient personal immoral action leads individuals to feel physically dirtier unless they 
are exposed to a punished transgressor. Study 2 tests whether individuals’ project felt 
contamination elicited by their own salient immoral behavior onto another transgressor, and 
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whether the subsequent punishment of that transgressor restores their own positive moral 
identity. Study 2 also tests whether exposure to a punished transgressor eliminates individuals’ 
desire to engage in compensatory moral behavior in response to a salient personal transgression. 
To frame these studies, below we provide more detail on the aforementioned lines of prior 
research; then we discuss how the current studies int grate and extend previous findings while 
providing evidence of a novel moral cleansing phenomenon. 
Overview of Previous Research 
Moral and Physical Purity 
According to conceptual metaphor theory (CMT; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), people use 
metaphor to understand abstract concepts in terms of di similar concepts which are more 
concrete and easier to understand. A conceptual metphor creates a mapping between 
corresponding elements of the two concepts, which allows people to use knowledge of the 
concrete concept as a framework for interpreting and evaluating analogous elements of the 
abstract concept. This perspective suggests that common expressions like “dirty deed” and 
“clean conscience” are more than ornamental figures of speech; instead, they reflect an 
underlying conceptual metaphor that people use to understand morality in terms of physical 
cleanliness (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  
Empirical evidence for this claim comes from recent studies showing that manipulating 
people’s experience of physical cleanliness affects their moral judgments in a metaphor-
consistent manner, even though they are unaware of the influence of their physical surroundings. 
In one such series of studies (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008), participants exposed to foul 
odor (Study 1) and participants who were seated in an unclean physical environment (Study 2) 
judged a variety of moral dilemmas (e.g., keeping money inside a found wallet, putting false 
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information on a resume´) to be more immoral. In a rel ted study examining cleansing acts, 
participants who washed their hands rated these moral dilemmas as less wrong than those not 
given the opportunity to physically cleanse themselves (Schnall, Benton & Harvey, 2008). 
Focusing on self-perceptions, Zhong, Strejcek, and Sivanathan (2010) showed that increasing 
participants’ perceptions of their own physical cleanliness led to increased ratings of their 
personal moral character. These studies indicate th the abstract thought of morality is grounded 
in and influenced by people’s concrete experience of physical cleanliness.  
Research has also shown that perceptions of morality have reciprocal effects on 
perceptions of physical cleanliness. Studies show that moral violations can elicit a disgust 
response, commonly evoked by unclean physical enviro ments and associated with the 
avoidance and expulsion of physical contaminants (Chapman, Kim, Susskind & Anderson, 2009; 
Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Moll et al., 2005; Rozin et al., 1994). Related findings show that 
people avoid contact with objects that have been prviously owned by, or been in contact with, 
immoral people (Rozin, Markwith, & McCauley, 1994). Specifically, Rozen and colleagues 
found that participants were less willing to use an object (e.g., a sweater, a bed, an automobile) if 
it was previously owned by a murderer. The authors explain this effect as an attempt to avoid 
“moral taint.”  In line with CMT, this finding illustrates how people use their knowledge about 
the spread of physical contaminates to judge the impact of actions on their own moral identity. 
While the aforementioned research focuses on the avoid nce of external sources of 
contamination, scholars have suggested that individuals can be “stained” by their own moral 
transgressions (e.g., Ricoeur, 1967). Recent empirical studies support the contention that 
individuals can feel physically soiled by their own immoral actions (Lee & Schwarz, 2010; 
Zhong & Lilenquist, 2006). Zhong and Liljenquist showed that participants reminded of their 
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own unethical (vs. ethical) behavior showed a greater desire to engage in physical cleansing 
behavior. Specifically, they found that participants whose own immorality was made salient were 
more likely to choose an antiseptic hand wipe over a pencil when offered both products as a gift 
for participating in the study. In another study, Zhong and Liljenquist manipulated whether or 
not participants physically cleansed themselves with an antiseptic wipe after being reminded of a 
personal moral transgression. They found that participants who contemplated their own immoral 
(vs. moral) actions reported increased feelings of guilt and an increased desire to engage in moral 
restoration behavior (e.g., volunteering to help another student in need), but both of these effects 
were eliminated if participants physically cleansed themselves.  
These findings illustrate an embodied cognitive process in which one’s own salient 
wrongdoings elicit feelings of guilt which are understood as both a moral and physical 
contamination of the self. As such, the act of cleansing the self of physical contamination 
removes feelings of guilt and circumvents the desire to restore one’s perceived moral identity 
through other means. Of course, insofar as the relationship between morality and physical 
cleanliness is bidirectional (Lee & Schwarz, 2012), we would also expect motivated efforts to 
expel or deny one’s immorality to both physically and morally “cleanse” the self. In the next 
section we review research on defensive projection, a motivated mechanism associated with the 
expulsion and denial of undesirable aspects of the self. 
Projection 
 Defensive projection is commonly defined as “the process of perceiving one’s own 
undesirable qualities in others as a way of protecting one’s self-image” (Govorun, Fuegen, & 
Payne, 2006, p. 781). Sigmund Freud (1915/1957) first described projection as a mechanism in 
which the ego "expels whatever within itself becomes a cause of displeasure" (p.136). Refining 
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her father’s theorizing, Anna Freud (1936) proposed what is now considered the classic account 
of projection. According to her formulation, when peo le are confronted with their faults, they 
are motivated to deny them by seeing those faults in others. In this account, projection is an 
unconscious defensive mechanism that serves to alleviate an individual’s anxiety by facilitating 
the denial of his or her own unacceptable thoughts, de ires, and impulses, ultimately maintaining 
a positive self-image (see also Jung’s analysis of the “shadow,” 1968).    
In a review of the early research literature Holmes (1969, 1978) concluded that there was 
no empirical evidence to support the psychoanalytic model of defensive projection. However, 
other researchers have criticized Holmes’ conclusion based on an overly stringent definition of 
defensive projection (Newman, Duff and Baumeister, 1997; Govorun et al., 2006; Schimel et al., 
2003). First of all, Holmes assumed that defensive projection required that the individual be 
unaware of possessing the traits he or she projected onto others. Second, Holmes assumed that 
projection must effectively reduce an individual’s anxiety stemming from the unwanted trait.  
As a consequence of these unnecessarily narrow definitional parameters, the topic of 
projection was largely ignored by mainstream social psychology until Newman, Duff, and 
Baumeister (1997) introduced a socio-cognitive re-formulation of the phenomenon. They posited 
that projection emerges as a byproduct of another defensive process, namely, the active 
suppression of undesirable traits. They proposed that the thought of having an undesirable trait 
poses a self-threat which the individual is motivated to alleviate through a process of active 
suppression. Research on ironic processing effects show that attempts to suppress a thought can 
lead to its hyper-accessibility (for a review, see W gner, 1992). Drawing on this research, 
Newman and colleagues posited that the heightened accessibility of the individual’s undesirable 
trait resulting from the suppression process influences his or her perception of others. In support 
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of this model, they found that those with a greater dispositional tendency to use suppression, as 
well as those induced to suppress a specific trait,both evidenced an increased tendency to project 
onto another. 
A number of more recent studies have provided converging evidence that the motivation 
to maintain a positive self-image can lead individuals to project their own salient undesirable 
traits onto others. Perhaps the strongest evidence for this phenomenon comes from research 
conducted by Schimel and colleagues (2003). In their first experiment, participants were 
randomly assigned to receive false feedback on a bogus personality test indicating that they 
either had high or low levels of repressed hostility. Participants then read an ambiguous vignette 
about a man named Donald whom they were asked to evaluate on an assortment of traits. Three 
of those traits were related to hostility (hot-tempered, hostile, irate), whereas the remaining traits 
were unrelated to anger or hostility (e.g., boring, i telligent, likable, narrow-minded, dependable, 
lazy). As predicted, participants primed to think they possessed high (vs. low) levels of latent 
hostility rated Donald as being significantly angrier. Importantly, the bogus feedback had no 
effects on evaluations of Donald on any of the other negative or positive traits.  
 Govorun and colleagues (2006) extended this work by testing the central role of self-
threat. In one study, participants were randomly assigned to write about either an instance in 
which they failed at an intellectual task, an instace in which an acquaintance failed at an 
intellectual task, or a typical day for either themselves or an acquaintance. Participants were then 
asked to indicate whether a variety of stereotypic traits were consistent with a specific group, 
student athletes. Six of the traits were related to a lack of intelligence (e.g., incompetent, stupid), 
whereas the remaining traits were not (e.g., motivated, cheerful, dishonest). Compared to 
participants in the other conditions, participants who recalled their own intellectual failure were 
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the fastest to endorse traits implying a lack of intelligence to be stereotypic of student athletes. 
Also, in line with Schimel et al.’s finding that people project a particular salient undesired trait 
and not global negativity, Goverun et al. found that t e salience of personal unintelligence did 
not affect endorsement of negative stereotypic traits that were unrelated to intelligence (e.g., 
arrogant). These results suggest that it is the threa  of possessing an undesirable trait oneself, and 
not simply exposure to that trait in another, that elevates one’s tendency to project that trait.  
Govorun and colleagues (2006) also examined the chara teristics that make someone an 
acceptable projection target. They hypothesized that people can only project their own 
undesirable traits onto a person who can be justifiably seen as possessing the trait in question. 
That is, people should be able to project their own moral inadequacy onto a thief, but not a Good 
Samaritan. In support of this hypothesis, they found that reminding participants of their own 
intellectual failings caused them to perceive another person to be less intelligent, but only if that 
person was a member of a group commonly stereotyped as unintelligent. The researchers 
explained that the stereotype of low intelligence provided participants with the justification 
necessary to project their own feelings of intellectual inadequacy onto the target. Importantly, as 
with their previous study, no effects were found on ratings of stereotypic and non-stereotypic 
traits unrelated to intelligence. These null effects show that the obtained effects represent the 
projection of a specific self-threatening trait, and not merely a general tendency to activate 
stereotypes or derogate stereotyped others in response t  a self-threat (Fein & Spencer, 1997).  
 While the aforementioned research provides compelling evidence for defensive 
projection, evidence that projection effectively serves a self-protective function is mixed. On the 
one hand, Schimel et al. (2003) showed that projecti n an effectively restore a positive personal 
identity. Specifically, participants told that they possessed an undesirable trait, and subsequently 
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given the opportunity to project that trait onto another person, showed reduced accessibility of 
trait-relevant words (Study 1) and were less likely to ascribe the undesirable trait to the self 
(Study 2). On the other hand, a number of other studies have failed to find evidence that 
projecting an undesirable self-attribute onto another has any discernible effect on participants’ 
self-perceptions or felt anxiety (Govorun, Fuegen, & Payne, 2005; Halpern, 1977; Holmes & 
Houston, 1971). 
In summation, the existing research on projection suggests that although people see their 
own salient undesirable qualities in certain others when the possession of these qualities 
threatens the self, this process does not necessarily function to alleviate the underlying threat. 
Thus, increasing the salience of one’s own immoral actions may produce an increased tendency 
to see immorality in another transgressor without necessarily alleviating one’s own perceived 
immorality. According to the ancient rituals of purification which form the anthropological 
touchstone for the current research, a secondary process is necessary to alleviate one’s moral 
contamination, namely, the punishment of the projection target.    
Punishment 
Punishment has long been described as a means of atoning for sin and alleviating the 
stain of immorality. As the Judeo-Christian Bible states: “punishment cleanses away evil” 
(Proverbs 20:30, NLT). Indeed, research shows that people view punishment as atoning for 
immoral behavior. Nelissen and Zeelenberg (2009) found that when people were induced to feel 
that they had harmed others but had no means of making reparations, they administered more 
self-punishment by denying themselves a pleasurable eward (Study 1) or giving themselves 
point deductions on an ego-relevant task (Study 2). These self-punishment effects were 
presumably motivated by participants’ desire to alleviate their increased feelings of guilt. 
                                                                                                                                        9
Similarly, Bastian and colleagues (2011) found thatwhen participants wrote about a time when 
they had harmed another person, the participants cho e to expose themselves to more physical 
pain by submerging their hands in a bucket of ice water for an extended period of time. The 
researchers also found that exposure to physical pain under these conditions served to reduce 
participants’ feelings of guilt, but did not affect other negative emotions (e.g., angry, distressed 
afraid).  
More recently, Inbar, Pizzaro, Gilovich and Ariely (2013) examined whether guilt 
specifically motivates self-punitive behavior. Participants were randomly assigned to describe 
either a time when they felt “most guilty,” a time when they felt “most sad,” or the last time they 
went to the grocery store. A manipulation check confirmed that participants in the guilt and 
sadness condition reported feeling higher levels of guilt and sadness, respectively. Two 
electrodes were then attached to the participants’ wri ts and they were given the opportunity to 
control the intensity of five self-administered electric shocks. After the shock task, participants 
reported the extent to which they felt a variety of p sitive and negative emotions. As predicted, 
the mean voltage in the guilt condition was significantly higher than the sadness or control 
condition. Self-reported feelings of guilt prior to the shock task were also correlated with higher 
voltage intensity. Furthermore, a higher intensity of self-administered shocks was associated 
with a greater reduction in participants’ self-reported guilt following the shocks. This study 
provides more evidence that people are motivated to receive punishment as a means of removing 
aversive feelings of guilt over their own immoral actions.             
 Because the aforementioned research exclusively assesses self-administered punishment, 
it is not possible to disentangle the guilt-alleviating effects of being punished from the potential 
effects of administering punishment. This distinction is important in light of recent research 
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showing that punishing others can bolster feelings of morality. Adams and Monin (2013) found 
that participants given the chance to punish a moral transgressor felt more “morally just” 
compared to those who saw the transgressor go unpunished (Study 1 & Study 2), and those who 
witnessed the transgressor be punished by a third party (Study 3). This research suggests that the 
act of punishing others bolsters a punisher’s self-p rceived moral identity. Importantly, this 
effect is conceptually distinct from the idea that punishment serves to atone for the immorality of 
the transgressor who is punished, regardless of who is administering the punishment.  
Overview of Current Research  
As noted earlier, many pre-modern cultures engaged in purification practices to maintain 
a positive moral identity, and while these practices are diverse in appearance, they are typically 
based on three beliefs: a) guilt over one’s immoral actions is a tangible contaminant; b) one’s 
own moral contamination can be placed onto others; and c) immorality is eliminated through the 
reception of punishment (Douglas, 1995). Although such beliefs may seem unusual today, the 
three lines of research just reviewed suggest these b li fs continue in the modern era to shape 
people’s moral judgments and perceptions. This raises the possibility that, even among modern 
individuals, witnessing another person being punished for a moral transgression may serve to 
“cleanse” the self of immorality. More specifically, we hypothesized that when people feel 
tainted by their immoral actions, they are motivated to see their own moral contamination in 
another transgressor; furthermore, the punishment of that transgressor serves to restore their own 
moral and physical purity.    
Two experiments tested variants on this broad hypothesis. In Study 1, we predicted that 
focusing participants on their immoral actions would cause them to report feeling physically 
contaminated, and this effect would be attenuated if they were presented with another moral 
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transgressor who was punished (but not an unpunished transgressor or a non-transgressor). In 
Study 2, we predicted that participants whose own immoral actions were made salient would 
perceive another target transgressor as more physicall  contaminated, and that this effect would 
occur indirectly through participants’ own increased f elings of personal guilt. We also predicted 
that participants primed with their own immoral actions would report decreased perceptions of 
personal morality and an increased desire to engage in compensatory moral behavior, but these 
effects would be attenuated if the target transgressor was punished by a third party.  
  Study 1 
Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) found that individuals who thought about their own 
immoral actions showed an increased desire to physically cleanse themselves. Based on our 
claim that the punishment of another moral transgressor “cleanses” the self of moral 
contamination, we hypothesized that increasing the sali nce of personal immoral actions would 
cause participants to feel physically dirtier, but no if they were additionally exposed to another 
transgressor who is punished. Because of the unique, morally cleansing effect of punishment, we 
did not expect this effect to occur when one was exposed to a non-punished transgressor, even 
when the extent and severity of the target’s wrongding was the same as that of the punished 
transgressor. By presenting equivalent transgressors and manipulating punishment, Study 1 
sought to rule out downward social comparison as an alternative explanation for the predicted 
effects. If these effects were simply due to downward social comparison, we would expect 
participants to feel less guilty about their own immoral actions after observing another person’s 
immoral action, regardless of whether that person’s immoral action was punished or not.  
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Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 153 American adults (76 female) ranging in 
age from 18 to 82 years (M = 32.87, SD = 13.40) who received $0.35 for completing an online 
survey made accessible through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk) service. The experiment 
was described as three unrelated studies investigating different aspects of memory, judgment, 
and personality. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (personal immorality 
salience: immorality salient vs. immorality-not-salient) × 3 (target type: non-transgressor vs. 
non-punished transgressor vs. punished transgressor) between-subjects factorial design, with 
self-reported feelings of personal physical cleanliness serving as the dependent variable of 
primary interest.  
 Personal immorality salience manipulation. As part of a supposed study on memory, 
participants responded to a prompt that asked them o recall and write about a specific time in 
their life. Participants in the immorality salient condition responded to a writing prompt based on 
Zhong and Liljenquist’s (2006) materials (see Appendix A). Specifically, they were asked to 
describe a time when they acted “in an unethical way.” Participants in the immorality-not-salient 
condition responded to a parallel prompt that asked th m to describe a time when they were 
“very bored,” an aversive topic intended to control for the general negativity of the immorality 
salience induction. All participants were instructed o write three to five sentences describing the 
situation, how they acted, and how it made them feel. In an attempt to control participants’ 
temporal distance from the recalled event, they were instructed to think of an event that occurred 
at least one year ago, but after their childhood.  
 Target manipulation. As part of an ostensibly unrelated second study, participants were 
then presented with a report from what was purported to be a university student misconduct 
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hearing. The first half of the report, which was the same for all participants, provided a case 
description of an incident in which a student was accused of stealing money from a charity 
donation box on campus (see Appendix B). The second half of the report which described the 
final judgment and disciplinary action taken by thecommittee differed according to condition 
(see Appendix C). Participants in the non-transgressor condition read that the student was found 
not guilty and that all the money was accounted for. Participants in the non-punished 
transgressor condition read that the student was found guilty of the offense, but no punitive 
action could be taken because the individual was no lo ger a student at the university. 
Participants in the punished transgressor condition read that the student was found guilty and
was expelled for the offense. All participants then rated the accused student on three negative 
traits (i.e., stupid, lazy, close-minded) along a 6-point scale (1 = not at all, 6 = very much; α = 
.67). These traits were assessed to ensure that partici nts perceived the punished and non-
punished targets as equally negative. Because thesenegative traits were not related to the target’s 
moral standing, we did not expect them to be affected by the personal immorality salience prime. 
 Personal physical cleanliness measure. Next, as part of another ostensibly unrelated 
third study, participants were given a questionnaire instructing them to indicate their agreement 
with four statements about their current feelings of personal physical cleanliness: “I feel 
exceptionally clean”; “I feel very sanitary”; “I feel filthy” (reverse scored); “I feel polluted” 
(reverse scored). Responses were made on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly 
agree) and were averaged (after reverse-scoring the lattr two) to form composite scores (Mgrand 
= 4.42, SD = .81; α = .76). 
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Results 
Target ratings. To test our assumption that the punishment of a transgressor did not 
influence general negative attitudes toward the transgressor, we submitted negative trait ratings 
to a 2 (immorality salient vs. immorality-not-salient) × 3 (non-transgressor vs. non-punished 
transgressor vs. punished transgressor) ANOVA. As expected, we observed only a main effect 
of target type, F(2, 148) = 18.26, p < .001, such that the negative ratings for the punished 
transgressor (M = 4.52, SD = .84) and non-punished transgressors (M = 4.37, SD = 1.03) were 
higher than the negative trait ratings for the non-tra sgressor (M = 3.29, SD = 1.31; ps < .001). 
Negative ratings of the two transgressor conditions did not differ (p > .41).  
 Personal physical cleanliness. To test our primary contamination and cleansing 
hypotheses, we submitted ratings of personal physical cleanliness to the same personal 
immorality salience × target ANOVA. This analysis revealed a main effect of immorality 
salience, F(1, 148) = 4.68, p = .03, which was qualified by the predicted two-way interaction, 
F(2, 148) = 4.98, p = .01, ηp
2 = .06 (see Figure 1 for the pattern of means).  
In line with previous research (e.g., Zhong & Lilenquist, 2006), pairwise comparisons 
(Fisher’s LSD) revealed that in the non-transgressor condition, participants primed with their 
own immoral actions reported feeling significantly less physically clean (M = 4.07, SD = .73) 
compared to participants whose personal immorality was not made salient (M = 4.60, SD = .67; 
F(1, 148) = 5.63, p  = .02). Similarly, in the non-punished transgressor condition, participants 
primed with their own immoral actions reported feeling significantly less physically clean (M = 
4.06, SD = 1.08) compared to participants whose personal immorality was not made salient (M = 
4.67, SD = .69; F(1, 148) = 7.60, p  = .01).  
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In contrast, in the punished transgressor condition, participants’ feelings of personal 
physical cleanliness did not differ according to whether their own personal immorality was made 
salient (M = 4.62, SD = .50) or not (M = 4.32, SD = .93; F(1, 148) = 1.72, p  = .19). Also 
supporting predictions, in the immorality salient condition, participants exposed to a punished 
transgressor reported feeling significantly cleaner than those exposed to either a non-transgressor 
or non-punished transgressor (Fs > 4.49, ps < .04). No effect of target type on felt physical 
cleanliness was found in the immorality-not-salient condition (Fs < 2.70, ps > .10).  
Study 1 Discussion 
Supporting predictions, the salience of personal immoral actions led participants to report 
feeling physically dirtier, but this effect was eliminated if participants were additionally 
presented with another transgressor who was punished, but not a non-transgressor or a 
transgressor who was not punished. These results are consistent with Zhong and Liljenquist’s 
(2006) research suggesting that people can be physicall  soiled by their own immoral actions, 
but they go further to support our claim that the punishment of another moral transgressor by a 
third party can effectively eliminate the feelings of personal physical contamination evoked by 
one’s own salient personal transgressions.1 
Study 1 also helps to rule out social comparison processes as an alternative mechanism 
behind our observed effects. If these effects were simply due to comparing the self with someone 
who is worse off, we would have expected that exposure to the same transgressor would 
similarly influence participants’ self-perceptions, regardless of whether or not that transgressor 
was ultimately punished. Yet the results of Study 1 show that punishment, and not simply 
downward social comparison, is necessary to cleanse the self of immoral actions. Still, the social 
comparison alternative has not been definitively rued out. It is possible that despite equivalent 
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descriptions and non-moral negativity ratings of the transgressor across both the punished and 
non-punished target conditions, participants judged th  punished transgressor as dirtier or more 
evil than the non-punished transgressor. This leaves op n the possibility that our effects are due 
to downward social comparison on these dimensions.  
Supplemental Study 
To rule out this possibility, we randomly assigned another group of 65 participants to one 
of the three target conditions used in Study 1 and asked them to rate the extent to which the 
target could be characterized as dirty and as evil (1 = not at all, 6 = very much). Dirty and evil 
scores were submitted to separate ANOVAs by target condition (see Table 1 for means and 
standard deviations). Results showed that the non-punished transgressor target was rated as 
dirtier and more evil than both the punished transgre sor target (ps < .04) and the non-
transgressor target (ps < .02). Ratings of the punished transgressor target and non-transgressor 
target did not differ on either characteristic (ps > .70). Additionally, replicating Study 1, an 
ANOVA on composite non-moral negative trait ratings (stupid, rude, conceited; α = .77) found 
that the punished transgressor target (M = 4.14, SD = .87) and non-punished transgressor target 
(M = 4.29, SD = 1.15) were given greater negative trait scores than he non-transgressor target 
(M = 2.76, SD = 1.16; ps < .02), though ratings of the two transgressor targets did not differ (p = 
.34).  
Although there were significant differences in the perceived morality and physical 
cleanliness of punished and non-punished transgressor targets, the pattern of these differences is 
inconsistent with a downward comparison account of the results obtained in Study 1. In fact, 
based on these supplemental findings, a social comparison perspective would predict that 
participants exposed to a non-punished transgressor target should feel comparably cleaner than 
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those exposed to a non-transgressor or punished transgressor target. In contrast, Study 1 found 
that when primed with their own immoral actions, participants felt less clean when exposed to a 
non-punished transgressor and non-transgressor compared to when exposed to a punished 
transgressor. This provides further evidence that Study 1’s effects were not the result of 
downward comparison processes.  
The results of this supplemental study also provide empirical support for our claim that 
punishment is perceived to expiate the moral transgressions of the punished target, restoring the 
target’s physical and moral purity. This moral cleansing function of punishment is critical to our 
claim that the punishment of another can serve to cleanse the self when contamination elicited by 
one’s own immoral actions is projected onto the punished target. While the results of Study 1 are 
consistent with this explanation, because the primary study never assessed the perceived 
cleanliness of the target, this study does not provide direct evidence that participants primed with 
their own immoral actions actually project their own felt contamination onto the target 
transgressor. We test this directly in Study 2.  
Study 2 
 
 Study 2 had three primary goals. The first goal wasto directly test whether people project 
their own salient immorality, which is experienced as a physical contamination (Study 1), onto 
another transgressor. To do this, we had all participants evaluate the same moral transgressor in 
the absence of any punitive information following the personal immorality salience 
manipulation. We hypothesized that participants who contemplated their own immoral actions 
would perceive the transgressor as physically dirtier as the result of their own increased feelings 
of personal guilt. Based on previous research on prjection (Govorun et al., 2006; Schimel et al., 
2003), we also hypothesized that the personal immorality prime would not influence ratings of 
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the target transgressor on negative traits unrelated to their moral standing. Null results on non-
moral negative evaluations of the transgressor would serve to rule out the possibility that rating 
another transgressor as physically dirty is simply an attempt to derogate the target. This is an 
important distinction since previous research has sown that derogating stigmatized others can 
bolster threatened feelings of self-esteem (Fein & Spencer, 1997). 
 Study 1 found that exposure to a punished transgres o  effectively restored participants’ 
perceived physical cleanliness following a salient personal transgression. The second goal of 
Study 2 was to test whether this effect could be replicated for participants’ perceived personal 
morality. We hypothesized that participants reminded of their own immoral behavior would 
perceive themselves as less moral unless they learned that the transgressor on whom they had 
projected their own moral contamination was punished. As in Study 1, punishment of the 
transgressor was always administered by a third party. This was done to ensure that any effects 
of punishment could not be explained by the moralizing effects of administering punishment to 
others (Adams & Monin, 2013).  
 The third goal of Study 2 was to investigate an important potential downstream 
consequence of the hypothesized moral cleansing process. Previous research has shown that 
people attempt to alleviate felt guilt over their own misdeeds by engaging in compensatory acts 
of prosocial behavior (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Darlington & Macker, 1966; Regan, Williams, 
& Sparling, 1972). As discussed in the Introduction, Zhong and Lilenquist (2006) found that the 
act of physical cleansing ameliorated participants de ire to engage in compensatory prosocial 
behavior in response to a reminder of their own immoral actions. Insofar as the punishment of 
another transgressor serves to morally “cleanse” the self, we hypothesized that participants 
primed with their own immoral behavior would report an increased desire to engage in prosocial 
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behavior (i.e., volunteer in a local blood drive), but this effect would be eliminated if they were 
additionally presented with a punished transgressor.     
Method 
 
Participants and design. Participants were 87 undergraduates (42 women) froma 
Midwestern university ranging in age from 18 to 34 years (M = 22.21, SD = 3.57), who 
participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. As with Study 1, the experiment was 
presented as three unrelated studies investigating different aspects of memory, judgment, and 
personality. In private cubicles, participants completed the first two of the purported three studies 
on computers while the materials for the third purported study were completed on paper and 
pencil surveys. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (personal immorality 
salience: immorality salient vs. immorality-not-salient) × 2 (target type: punished transgressor 
vs. non-punished transgressor) between-subjects factori l design.  
To test for projection, self-reported feelings of personal guilt were assessed as the 
hypothesized mediator with ratings of the perceived physical dirtiness of the target transgressor 
as the primary dependent variable. To test the moral cle nsing hypothesis, the primary dependent 
variables were participants’ rating of their personal moral character and their reported interest in 
engaging in prosocial behavior (i.e., joining a local blood drive). 
 Personal immorality salience manipulation. As part of a supposed study on memory 
and emotions, participants first responded to the same immorality salience manipulation used in 
Study 1. Participants randomly assigned to the immorality salient condition were asked to 
describe a time when they acted “in an unethical way,” whereas participants in the immorality-
not-salient condition were asked them to describe a time when t y were “very bored.”  
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 Guilt measure. Following this manipulation, participants were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they currently felt guilty using a 5-point scale (1 = very slightly or not at all, 5 = 
extremely). In addition to completing this single item measure of personal guilt (Mgrand = 1.54, 
SD = .86), participants also rated the extent to which they felt 19 other emotions included in 
Watson, Clark and Tellegen’s (1988) Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Ten of 
these items were positive emotion words (interested, alert, excited, inspired, strong, determined, 
attentive, enthusiastic, active, proud) and the remaining nine were negative emotion words 
(angry, distressed, upset, nervous, ashamed, scared, hostile, jittery, afraid). Separate composite 
scores were computed for the positive emotion subscale (Mgrand = 2.51, SD = .87; α = .91) and 
the negative emotion subscale excluding guilt (Mgrand = 1.54, SD = .55; α = .84).  
 Target manipulation. Next, participants were told that they would take part in a 
purportedly unrelated study on memory and judgment that involved reading short news articles. 
Participants were first presented with an experimenter-fabricated news story about a hit-and-run 
car accident in which a 25 year old man drove through a red light and hit a pedestrian before 
fleeing the scene (see Appendix D). The article concluded by saying that the driver had been 
identified but not yet apprehended. In addition to detailing the crime, the article also included a 
photograph of the driver who represented the target t ansgressor in the current study.2 
 After reading the article, participants were presented with an ostensible memory test that 
asked them to recall information about the article they had read. As part of this test participants 
were asked to, “think back to the photograph of the perpetrator (that is, the driver who hit 
someone)” and rate their agreement with various statements about his appearance. Two of the 
items concerned the transgressor’s physical dirtiness: “The perpetrator appeared to be dirty” ; 
“The perpetrator appeared to have poor hygiene.” Responses were made on a 6-point scale (1 = 
                                                                                                                                        21
strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) and were averaged to form composite scores (Mgrand = 
3.39, SD = 1.33; α = .87). 
 To assess participants’ general negative evaluation of the transgressor, we also instructed 
participants to respond to three items rating the ext nt to which the transgressor was 
“incompetent,” “stupid,” and “clever” (reverse scored). Responses were made on a 6-point scale 
(1 = not at all, 6 = very much) and were averaged to form composite negative trait scores (Mgrand 
= 5.15, SD = 1.06; α = .84). These traits were assessed to ensure that the personal immorality 
prime was not simply increasing participants’ general tendency to derogate the transgressor. As 
in Study 1, given the specificity of the projection phenomenon, we did not expect ratings of these 
non-moral negative traits to be affected by the personal immorality salience manipulation.  
 Next, all participants were randomly assigned to be presented with one or two possible 
experimenter-fabricated news articles supposedly written 6 months after the first article that 
provided updated information about the aforementioned hit-and-run accident (see Appendix E). 
This article comprised our target type manipulation. Participants randomly assigned to the 
punished transgressor condition read that the driver had been apprehended, convicted of various 
charges and was currently serving a three year prison sentence. Participants randomly assigned to 
the non-punished transgressor condition read that the driver had not been apprehended, but if 
caught, could face various charges and a three year prison sentence.   
 Personal morality measure. Participants were then presented with paper survey packets 
purported to be part of another unrelated personality study. Included in this packet was a 
modified version of a questionnaire constructed by Zhong and colleagues (2010) which asked 
participants to rank themselves in comparison to other undergraduates at their university on eight 
different dimensions (sense of humor, intelligence, moral character, creativity, physical 
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attractiveness, physical fitness, social sensitivity, leadership). Participants responded to each item 
by indicating the percentile that described their position relative to others, from 0 (worse than all 
others) to 100 (better than all others). In line with Zhong et al. (2010), we used participants’ 
response to the moral character item as a measure of th ir perceived personal morality (Mgrand = 
80.24, SD = 10.01).  
 Prosocial behavior intention measure. At the end of the study, participants read about a 
community outreach program designed to engage college students in local volunteering 
opportunities. Participants were asked to indicate wh ther or not they would be interested in 
participating in a local blood donation drive by marking a Yes or No response box. Their 
response to this item provided a categorical assessment of participant’s willingness to engage in 
prosocial behavior.  
Results 
Guilt. We first conducted a univariate ANOVA on self-reported feelings of guilt. We did 
not include target type as an independent variable in this analysis because the target manipulation 
came after assessing participants’ guilt. However, a Levene’s test for heterogeneity of variance 
indicated that responses to our measure of personal guilt violated the homogeneity of variance 
assumption, F(1, 85) = 21.88, p < .001. Accordingly, we conducted Welch’s alternative ANOVA 
procedure on personal guilt scores, which Tomarken and Serlin (1986) identify as the optimal 
procedure when the homogeneity of variance assumption is violated. As predicted, this analysis 
revealed that participants whose immorality was made salient reported feeling significantly more 
guilt (M = 1.88, SD = 1.00) compared to participants whose immorality was not made salient (M 
= 1.20, SD = .51), F(1, 61.93) = 15.70, p < .001. Importantly, no effect of personal immorality 
salience was found on either subscale of the PANAS (positive subscale: F < 1, p > .88; negative 
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subscale without guilt: F < 1, p > .49). Furthermore, the primary effects of immorality salience 
on guilt remained significant when simultaneously controlling for the positive and negative 
subscale scores (p < .001).  
Physical dirtiness of target transgressor. To test the prediction that participants 
reminded of their own immorality will perceive another transgressor as more physically 
contaminated, we conducted a univariate ANOVA on participants’ ratings of the physical 
dirtiness of the target transgressor. Once again, we did not include target type in this analysis 
because this manipulation came after participants’ made their evaluations of the target. As 
predicted, this analysis revealed that participants in he immorality salient condition rated the 
transgressor as physically dirtier (M = 3.77, SD = 1.19) than participants in the immorality-not-
salient condition (M = 3.02, SD = 1.35; F(1, 85) = 7.37, p = .01, ηp
2 = .08). To test whether this 
effect reflects a tendency to globally derogate the target, we submitted general negative trait 
ratings of the transgressor to the same ANOVA. As expected, we observed no significant effect 
of immorality salience on non-moral negative ratings of the transgressor (F < 1, p > .53). 
Mediation of personal immorality salience on perceived physical dirtiness of 
transgressor by guilt. We conducted an indirect effect analysis to test our mediation hypothesis 
that the increased perceived physical dirtiness of the transgressor in the personal immorality 
salience condition occurs through participants’ increased feelings of personal moral 
contamination. 
 Using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping procedure, we regressed perceived 
dirtiness of target transgressor onto the effect of personal immorality salience (coded: immorality 
salient = 1; immorality-not-salient = 0) with guilt scores entered as the proposed mediator. Five-
thousand bootstrap resamples were performed. The 95% confidence interval obtained for the 
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indirect effects of immorality salience on perceived transgressor dirtiness scores through guilt 
did not contain zero (.07, .50). These results are consistent with the mediation hypothesis that the 
increase in participants’ ratings of the transgressor’  physical dirtiness in response to 
participants’ own salient transgressions occurred indirectly through a corresponding increase in 
feelings of personal guilt (see Figure 2 for a graphical depiction of the model). 
Personal morality. We then tested the prediction that the punishment of a transgressor 
imbued with one’s own felt contamination can restore ne’s positive moral identity. We 
submitted participants’ self-reported ratings of their own morality to a 2 (personal immorality 
salience) × 2 (target type) ANOVA. This analysis yielded significant main effects for both 
immorality salience (F (1, 83) = 10.13, p = .002) and target type (F (1, 83) = 9.50, p = .003), 
which were qualified by the predicted two-way interaction, F (1, 83) = 16.85, p = .01, ηp
2 = .16 
(see Figure 3 for the pattern of means). Importantly, this interaction remained significant when 
controlling for participants’ comparative rankings of their standing on morally-irrelevant but 
positive traits (e.g., creativity; p = .01). 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that when exposed to a non-punished transgressor, 
participants primed with their own immoral actions reported lower ratings of their own relative 
moral character (M = 70.71, SD = 8.98) compared to those whose personal immorality was not 
made salient (M = 84.05, SD = 8.61; F(1, 83) = 25.68, p < .001). In contrast, when exposed to a 
punished transgressor, participants’ ratings of their own moral character did not differ according 
to whether their own personal immorality was made salient (M = 83.86, SD = 8.85) or not (M = 
82.17, SD = 7.66; F(1, 83) < 1.00, p  = .51). Also, consistent with the primary predictions, for 
participants whose personal immorality was made sali nt, exposure to a punished (vs. non-
punished) transgressor increased their ratings of their own moral character (F 1, 83) = 25.56, p < 
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.001). No effect of punishment on personal morality ratings was found in the immorality-not-
salient condition (F(1, 83) < 1.00, p = .47).  
Prosocial behavior intentions. See Table 2 for distribution of responses to the 
opportunity to engage in prosocial behavior (local volunteering). We regressed these responses 
onto personal immorality salience (immorality salient vs. immorality-not-salient), target type 
(punished transgressor vs. non-punished transgressor), and their interaction using a logistic 
regression analysis. This analysis yielded a significant two-way interaction, B = -2.48, SE = 1.02, 
Wald = 5.94, p = .02 (see Figure 4 the pattern of odds ratios).  
Follow-up analyses revealed that when exposed to a non-punished transgressor, the odds 
of reporting an interest in joining a blood donation drive (saying yes compared to no), when 
participants’ personal immorality was made salient were 3.52 times the odds of expressing an 
interest when their immorality was not made salient, B = -1.26, SE = .67, Wald = 3.49, p = .06. 
In contrast, when exposed to a punished transgressor, differences in the odds ratios for those in 
the immorality salient and immorality-not-salient conditions did not statistically differ (B = 1.21, 
SE = .76, Wald = 2.56, p = .11). 
Also consistent with the primary predictions, for participants whose personal immorality 
was made salient, the odds of expressing interest in joining a blood donation drive when exposed 
to a non-punished transgressor were 6.97 times the odds of expressing interest in joining a blood 
donation drive when exposed to a punished transgreso , B = -1.94, SE = .76, Wald = 6.53, p = 
.01. In contrast, for participants whose personal immorality was not made salient, the odds ratios 
did not differ between those exposed to a punished or non-punished transgressor (B = .54, SE = 
.67, Wald = 0.63, p = .43). 
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Study 2 Discussion 
Supporting our first primary prediction, the salienc  of personal immoral actions led 
participants to feel increased personal guilt, which in turn led them to perceive another moral 
transgressor as physically dirtier. This finding shows that guilt over one’s own immoral actions 
is grounded in the concrete experience of physical contamination. Additionally, it shows that 
participants are motivated to project this contamination onto another transgressor. The null 
effects of immorality salience on both self-reported negative emotions (excluding guilt) and non-
moral negative ratings of the target transgressor rule out the possibility that the observed effects 
simply reflect variation in negative affect or global derogation of a target in response to a self-
relevant threat.  
The obtained effects on participants’ perceived personal morality were consistent with 
the effects obtained in Study 1 on participants’ perceived physical cleanliness. Supporting our 
second prediction, the salience of personal immoral actions led participants to rate themselves as 
less moral compared to peers, unless they read that the transgressor who served as a projection 
target had been punished for his crimes. These results provide evidence that the punishment of 
another transgressor can function to alleviate one’s own felt immorality. Distinguishing this 
phenomenon from more general self-esteem maintenanc or enhancement effects, the primary 
findings remained significant when controlling for participants’ self-evaluations in non-moral 
domains. Additionally, the fact that participants were explicitly asked to compare their own 
moral character with that of their fellow students makes it unlikely that the obtained results are 
the result of a downward social comparison with the transgressor.  
 Supporting our third prediction, the salience of personal immoral actions motivated an 
increased willingness to express interest in volunteering in a local blood drive, unless the other 
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transgressor was punished. These results mirror Zhong and Liljenquist’s (2006) finding that 
physical cleansing alleviated people’s willingness to volunteer to help another student in need. 
This suggests that like physical cleansing, the punishment of a transgressor perceived to possess 
one’s own felt contamination also serves a moral cleansing function for the self. Furthermore, 
although we did not directly measure participants’ actual prosocial behavior, the results of Study 
2 suggest that the punishment of other transgressors can, under certain conditions, have a 
deleterious effect on people’s own expressions of pr sociality.  
General Discussion 
 The two studies supported the broad hypothesis that w en people feel tainted by their 
immoral actions, they are motivated to see their moal contamination in another transgressor; 
furthermore, the punishment of that transgressor serve  to restore their own moral and physical 
purity. Study 1 found that when participants contemplated their own immoral actions they felt 
less physically clean, unless they were exposed to another wrongdoer who was punished for his 
transgression. Study 2 found that participants who contemplated their own immoral actions 
perceived another wrongdoer as physically dirtier va increased feelings of personal guilt, and 
felt less moral and more willing to engage in moral restoration behavior unless they learned that 
the contaminated transgressor had been punished. Importantly, the increased feelings of physical 
and moral contamination elicited by personal immorality salience were not mitigated by 
exposure to a moral transgressor who was not punished. These studies suggest that personal 
immoral actions induce feelings of contamination that individuals are motivated to project onto a 
target whose punishment is perceived to remove their own contamination.  
Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) claims that people can restore or maintain a 
positive self-image by comparing themselves with others who are worse off than themselves 
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(i.e., making a downward social comparison). Social comparison research shows that people are 
motivated to engage in a downward social comparison when their self-image is threatened 
(Wills, 1981). This raises the possibility that peole threatened with their own immoral behavior 
in the current studies may have perceived themselve as cleaner or less immoral by making a 
downward social comparison with the target transgressor who was perceived to be dirtier and 
more immoral than they were.  
We attempted to rule out this possibility by exposing participants to equivalent 
transgressors and only manipulating whether or not the ransgressor was punished. Although 
perceptions of the transgressor were not directly assessed in Study 1, a supplemental study found 
that participants rated the punished transgressor as cle ner and less evil than the non-punished 
transgressor. Thus, if participants were engaged in a social comparison with the target 
transgressor, they should have felt comparably cleaner when exposed to the non-punished (vs. 
punished) transgressor. However, Study 1 found that participants in the personal immorality 
salience condition reported feeling physically clean r when exposed to a punished (vs. non-
punished) transgressor. Study 2 attempted to ensure that participants’ did not engage in 
downward social comparison with the target transgressor by having participants rate their moral 
character in comparison with a different target, their student peers. 
To further establish discriminant validity, we took steps to distinguish the phenomenon of 
projection from that of defensive derogation of others. Previous research by Fein and Spencer 
(1997) found that participants who received negative feedback on a self-relevant performance 
task were more likely to derogate a stereotyped targe , in what they described as a kind of 
defensive prejudice. They also found that derogatin a target in response to negative self-relevant 
feedback served to increased participants’ self-esteem. This raises the possibility that 
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participants’ tendency to rate a target transgresso a  physically dirty when reminded of their 
own immoral actions in the current studies may have be n part of an effort to derogate the target 
in order to bolster their own flagging self-esteem. If this were the case, we would expect personal 
immorality salience to increase general negative evaluations of the target transgressor as well as 
positive self-evaluations. In contrast to this prediction, Study 2 found that personal immorality 
salience had no effect on participants’ global negative ratings of the target transgressor and no 
effect on participants’ non-moral self-ratings. In this way, the current research meets an 
empirical criterion established in prior research (Govorun et al., 2006; Schimel et al., 2003) for 
distinguishing defensive projection from self-threat-induced derogation: the increased salience of 
an undesirable trait in the self, influenced evaluations of a target individual specifically with 
regard to that trait, and not with regard to other n gative traits as would be the case in global 
derogation.    
Taken together, the results of the present studies provide evidence for a moral cleansing 
mechanism that guides moral attitudes and interpersonal perceptions in a similar manner today as 
it appears to have done in pre-modern cultures across the world. While research on metaphor, 
projection, and punishment have shown that the core assumptions of pre-modern cleansing 
rituals remain relevant, our data show that motivations to place one’s own immorality onto 
others and see them punished may continue to play an important role in the pursuit and 
maintenance of moral cleanliness. In addition to providing initial evidence for a practically 
important self-serving process behind moral reasoning, the current research broadens the 
theoretical and empirical scope of the three research eas it builds upon, as described in the next 
sections.  
Advancing Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Research  
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 Research investigating CMT has provided a wealth of evidence indicating that people 
draw on their knowledge of a familiar, concrete concept to understand superficially unrelated 
abstract concepts (see Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010). Studies have shown that manipulating 
experience with a concrete concept (e.g., inducing sensory and motor states) produces metaphor-
consistent effects on perceptions related to an abstract concept (e.g., Lee & Schwarz, 2011; 
Schnall et al., 2008; Zhong et al., 2010). Likewise, manipulating representations of an abstract 
concept can produce metaphor-consistent effects on perceptions and sensations related to a 
concrete concept (Lee & Schwarz, 2010; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Lee and Schwarz (2012) 
claim that a juxtaposition of these separate lines of work reveals a bidirectional relationship 
between the abstract and concrete which emerges throug  the co-activation of abstract and 
metaphorically associated concrete concepts. However, since investigations of concrete-to-
abstract effects and abstract-to-concrete effects have generally been studied in isolation, there is 
a dearth of evidence directly assessing this co-activation hypothesis.  
The present studies included measures assessing both the abstract and associated 
metaphoric concept. In support of Lee and Schwarz’s (2012) co-activation hypothesis, we found 
that the manipulation of the abstract concept produces parallel effects on both morality-relevant 
and cleanliness-relevant outcome measures. Specifically, Study 2 found that a personal 
immorality prime elicited both feelings of guilt and perceptions of physical contamination. 
Additionally, Study 1 and 2 found identical interaction effects on participants’ perceptions of 
their own physical cleanliness and personal morality. In support of a bidirectional relationship, 
we found that the manipulation of an abstract concept (immorality salience) produced a 
complementary sensorimotor experience (decreased physical cleanliness), which was influenced 
by a subsequent manipulation of the abstract concept (ex iating punishment).  
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The present studies directly contribute to research on the specific metaphorical link 
between morality and cleanliness by showing that, in addition to cleansing oneself, the 
punishment of others viewed as immoral represents a s rategy for metaphorically “cleansing” the 
self of moral wrongdoing. These studies also provide a novel interpretation of previous research 
showing that exposure to unclean physical conditions can motivate people to make harsher moral 
judgments. Schnall and colleagues (2008) proposed that this effect represents people’s tendency 
to misattribute physical disgust induced by an unclean environment (Study 2) or a foul smell 
(Study 1) as moral disgust caused by another transges or. However, the present research 
suggests that the harsh judgments of a moral transges or may represent a motivated desire to 
purge one’s own felt contamination by projecting it on o a punishable transgressor. In contrast, 
an attempt to explain the results of the current studies as a tendency to misattribute the cause of 
disgust over one’s own immoral actions to the physical contamination of a target transgressor 
does not explain why the punishment of that transgressor serves to morally and physically 
“cleanse” the self. 
Advancing Projection Theory and Research 
After a long period of neglect, Newman and colleagues’ (1997) reintroduced the 
phenomenon of projection as an acceptable topic for empirical inquiry. A number of recent 
studies investigating projection have found evidence that the desire to maintain a positive self-
image can motivate individuals to see in others the undesirable traits they fear they themselves 
possess. However, support for the defensive functio of projection has been mixed. Some studies 
have found evidence that projection can reduce the proj ctor’s perceived possession of the 
undesired trait (Schimel et al., 2003); other studies have not (Govorun et al., 2005; Halpern, 
1977; Holmes & Houston, 1971). In light of these inco sistent findings, the very existence of 
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projection as envisaged by generations of psychoanalytic nd existentially-oriented theorists as a 
defensive mechanism seems to have fallen in doubt.  
The present research sheds new light on this controversy by demonstrating that 
attributing one’s own undesirable self-attributes onto a target other is necessary but not sufficient 
to restore one’s positive moral identity. In addition, the person needs to observe the punishment 
of the projection target. This is consistent with Freud’s (1915/1957) observation that projection is 
often characterized by a desire to aggress against the projection target. The present studies add to 
Freud’s theorizing by showing that aggression towards the projection target can be realized in 
punishment meted out by a third-party which serves an essential moral cleansing function. 
This enhanced conception of defensive projection which includes both the ascription of 
one’s immorality onto a projection target and the punishment of that target represents a 
significant contribution to the existing theory and future research on projection. For one, this 
proposed two-part process provides a useful way to distinguish projection from two mechanisms 
that are closely related on the surface: social comparison processes and self-threat-induced 
derogation. This enhanced conception of defensive proj ction also highlights the need to 
consider the role of post-projection processes suchas t e punishment of a projection target. 
Ultimately, the present research sets a new agenda for t king a fresh empirical look at projection 
as a unique and practically important process that guides moral attitudes and interpersonal 
perception.  
Advancing Moral Punishment Theory and Research 
Recent studies have found evidence that punishment is perceived to atone for one’s 
immoral behavior (Bastian et al., 2011; Inbar et al., 2013; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). This 
research shows that when an individual’s own immoral behavior is made salient, they are 
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motivated to self-punish as a means of reducing increased feelings of guilt. However, as 
discussed in the Introduction, because this literature focuses exclusively on self-punishment, 
these studies confound the expiating effect of being punished with the act of administering 
punishment. This is particularly problematic in light of recent research showing that the 
opportunity to administer punishment to another transgressor bolsters one’s own perceived moral 
identity (Adams & Monin, 2013).  
To our knowledge, the present research provides the trongest evidence to date that 
punishment is perceived to alleviate the immorality of the punished target. These studies 
accomplished this by exposing participants to a target transgressor who was punished by a third 
party. Results of the supplemental study showed that participants perceived a punished 
transgressor to be significantly less evil than an equivalent non-punished transgressor, and on par 
with a non-transgressor. The punishment of the transgressor not only reduced his perceived 
immorality, but appeared to effectively absolve the transgressor of sin. Study 2 also found 
indirect evidence that punishment removes the punished transgressor’s moral taint by showing 
that the third-party punishment of the target transgre sor on whom participants had projected 
their own moral contamination served to vicariously restore participants’ perceived moral 
identity. At the same time, consistent with Adams and Monin’s (2013) findings, in the absence of 
personal immorality salience, reading that a target transgressor had been punished by a third 
party had no effect on participants’ perceived morality.         
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Although the current studies provide strong initial evidence for the hypothesized moral 
cleansing function of punishing moral transgressors, there are a few notable limitations that 
should be addressed by future research. We propose that the punishment of a target transgressor 
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metaphorically cleanses the self of moral contaminatio  because the transgressor is seen as 
possessing one’s own contamination. The present studie  manipulated the punishment of a target 
transgressor (Studies 1 & 2) and measured participants’ tendency to project their own felt 
contamination onto the transgressor (Study 2). As aconsequence, these studies illustrate that 
people project their own felt contamination onto anther transgressor and are cleansed by the 
transgressor’s punishment. However, because we measured, rather than manipulated, 
participants’ tendency to project onto the transgresor, these studies did not directly test the 
hypothesized causal role of projection in the moral cleansing process. It remains possible that the 
punishment of a target other may bolster one’s perceived personal morality and physical 
cleanliness in the absence of projection. Perhaps simply reading about another transgressor’s 
punishment in the current studies increased the accssibility of morality- and cleanliness-relevant 
thoughts which in turn influence participants’ self-perceptions.  
This explanation seems unlikely, given that exposure to a punished transgressor did not 
affect participants’ physical cleanliness or personal morality ratings in the absence of a personal 
immorality salience induction. However, the hypothesiz d role of projection could be directly 
assessed by manipulating whether or not participants re able to project their own felt 
contamination onto a another target. Govorun and colleagues (2006) found that people are only 
able to project onto a target who can be justifiably seen to possess the self-attribute people wish 
to deny in themselves. This implies that participants should be unable to project their own felt 
moral contamination onto a target perceived to be innocent of wrongdoing. Thus, we would 
predict that participants reminded of their own immoral behavior would feel morally and 
physically cleaner when exposed to the punishment of a target transgressor (in whom they can 
see their own moral taint), but not when exposed to the punishment of a patently innocent target.       
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The moral cleansing phenomenon evidenced in the present studies is explained as a 
motivated mechanism for eliminating a perceived threat to one’s own moral identity. In support 
of this conceptualization, the primary cleansing effects occurred in response to a personal moral 
value threat. However, our ability to draw firm conlusions about the motivational roots of this 
process is limited by various methodological factors. For instance, these studies did not include a 
comparison condition where participants were primed with immorality salience independent of 
their own behavior. Therefore, it remains possible that simply priming the concept of immorality 
in the absence of a self-threat would produce the same effects. Importantly, Govorun and 
colleagues’ (2006) research on defensive projection d sputes this claim. Specifically, these 
researchers found that whereas participants who wrote about their own intellectual failure 
projected unintelligence onto an applicable target, writing about the intellectual failure of an 
acquaintance produced no discernible effect.  
Additionally, manipulating the third-party punishment of a transgressor allowed us to 
isolate the unique moral cleansing effect of punishment but did not allow us to assess whether 
participants were actually motivated to see the transgressor punished. Investigating this 
possibility would require giving participants the opportunity to voice support for another 
transgressor’s punishment. Insofar as participants re motivated to see a moral transgressor 
punished to eliminate their own felt moral contamination, we would expect a personal 
immorality salience induction to drive increased support for punishing a target transgressor via 
increased feelings of personal guilt. We would also expect that having an alternative means of 
alleviating one’s own felt moral or physical contamination (e.g., physical cleansing, self-
punishment, engaging in compensatory moral behavior) w uld eliminate this effect.  
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Although the present studies investigated how the punishment of a moral transgressor can 
ameliorate a salient individual-level threat to one’s personal moral identity, the historic 
purification rituals that inspired this research were notably collective in nature. Such rituals 
maintained the perceived moral purity of the greater social community by transferring the 
community’s sins onto a target that could be punished or expelled. Recent psychological research 
shows that people are strongly motivated to perceive the social groups with which they identify 
as moral (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). There is also a large body of research showing that 
people can feel guilt over illegitimate harm perpetated by their group, even when they bear no 
personal responsibility for the harm done (see Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). This raises the 
possibility that the phenomenon investigated in the present studies in response to an individual-
level morality threat may also operate in response to group-level morality threat when people 
self-categorize at the level of their group. If so,we would expect that reminding people of their 
group’s immoral actions should motivate people to see the group’s perceived moral 
contamination in target transgressors who can be punished to restore the group’s moral identity. 
Given that the threat is provoked at the level of the group, it is possible that a stigmatized 
subgroup, rather than an individual, may serve as the projection target under such conditions. 
Acts of “ethnic cleansing” may represent an extreme form of this behavior.    
Broader Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 In addition to integrating and extending previous lines of research, the current studies 
also have broader implications about the motivation, fu ction, and consequences of punishing 
moral transgressors. In particular, these studies help shed new light on people’s age-old 
fascination with punishment, ranging from public executions (Foucault, 1977) to Court TV. 
Much of the existing psychological literature suggests that the urge to see a transgressor 
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punished is grounded in the desire to see the world as a just place where people get what they 
deserve (Lerner, 1980). From this perspective, an unpunished transgressor poses a threat to one’s 
belief is a just world which is ameliorated by the ransgressor’s punishment. This suggests that 
underlying the desire to see a transgressor punished i  the desire to see justice done.  
 The current research offers a complementary perspective pointing to another motive 
underlying people’s desire to see a transgressor punished; the desire to expunge the taint of guilt 
left by their own unethical behaviors. This is consistent with Alexander and Staub’s (1956) 
analysis of criminology and penology claiming that individuals’ urge to see criminal offenders 
punished can reflect their own internal moral conflicts. Supporting this contention, recent 
research has shown that reminding people of their own group’s culpability for illegitimate harm-
doing increases support for punishing another perceived harm-doer (Rothschild, Landau, Molina, 
Branscombe & Sullivan, in press). Importantly, the current studies go beyond this research by 
showing that the punishment of a moral transgressor alleviates people’s feelings of physical and 
moral contamination over their own immoral actions. This process may have particularly serious 
consequences in real-world contexts in which people make punitive judgments of others, such as 
in a court of law.  
  The current research also has important implications for people’s general willingness to 
engage in both prosocial and antisocial behavior. A litany of research has shown that threats to 
people’s moral identity can motivate compensatory efforts to engage in moral behaviors (e.g., 
Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Darlington & Macker, 1966; Regan, Williams, & Sparling, 1972). The 
current research found that exposure to a punished transgressor bolstered people’s perceived 
personal moral identity in response to a moral value threat and reduced their willingness to 
engage in such compensatory behavior. This suggests that the punishment of a single moral 
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transgressor may serve to reduce the willingness of countless other people to engage in prosocial 
behavior.  
Other research has shown that boosting people’s perceiv d moral self-concept can 
provide them with the “moral license” to engage in immoral behavior without experiencing 
aversive feelings of guilt (e.g., Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). If exposure to a punished 
transgressor boosts people’s own perceived morality, this suggests that the punishment of a 
single moral transgressor may ultimately increase countless others’ willingness to engage in 
antisocial behavior. Thus, although institutions may seek to publicize the punishment of a moral 
transgressor to promote moral behavior and deter others from transgressing, in certain contexts, 
this type of exposure may inadvertently have the opposite effect. In a world saturated with 
sensationalized stories of crime and punishment, the present research highlights the potentially 
negative impact such information can have on people’s thoughts and actions. 
Conclusion 
 The current studies provide strong evidence linking pre-modern rituals of atonement with 
a modern psychological phenomenon in which the punishment of a moral transgressor serves to 
morally cleanse the self. Of course, these studies also open up a slew of additional questions. 
Most notably, what are the boundary conditions for this phenomenon? Does the punished 
transgressor’s moral violation need to be more severe than one’s own? Is the cleansing effect 
equally potent when the punishment is more or less s vere? Does the punishment need to be 
perceived to “fit the crime”? What would happen if people witnessed the moral transgressor 
administer self-punishment? Are there crimes for which this type of moral cleansing would be 
ineffective? Under what conditions might people choose this method of moral cleansing over 
other non-punitive guilt reduction strategies? Are th re individual differences that may facilitate 
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or inhibit this cleansing effect? Can this effect be generalized to different cultural and religious 
contexts?  
Importantly, the present studies do not reveal exactly why punishment is perceived to 
cleanse a moral transgressor. Is a punished transgressor seen as more moral because he or she is 
perceived to have learned his or her lesson, and is thus less likely to act immorally? Or is the 
punishment more broadly seen as a means of squelching deviance and bringing the transgressor 
back in line with social norms? Furthermore, reflecting on the larger social implications of this 
phenomenon, we might consider whether political leaders might strategically provide scapegoats 
to be punished as a means of giving their followers r spite from their immoral actions in order to 
maintain social control? An investigation of this possibility could provide insight into horrific 
real world acts of “ethnic cleansing” or genocide. Future research targeting such questions will 
help to paint a more nuanced depiction of this phenomenon and its relevance in the real-world.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        40
References 
Adams, G. S., & Monin, B. (2013). Punishers feel license to misbehave. Unpublished  
manuscript. 
Alexander, F., & Staub, H. (1956). The criminal, the judge, and the public: A psychological  
analysis. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
Allport, G. W. (1979). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. (Original work  
published 1954). 
Bastian, B., Jetten, J., & Fasoli, F. (2011). Cleansing the soul by hurting the flesh: The guilt- 
reducing effect of pain. Psychological Science, 22, 334–335. 
Branscombe, N. R., & Doosje, B. (Eds.). (2004). Collective guilt: International perspectives.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Carlsmith, J. M., & Gross, A. E. (1969). Some effects of guilt on compliance. Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology, 11, 232–239. 
Chapman, H. A., Kim, D. A., Susskind, J. M., & Anderson, A. K. (2009). In bad taste: Evidence  
for the oral origins of moral disgust. Science, 323, 1179–1180. 
Darlington, R. B., & Macker, C. E. (1966). Displacem nt of guilt-produced altruistic behavior.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 4 2–443. 
Douglas, T. (1995). Scapegoats: Transferring blame. New York: Routledge Press.  
Fein, S., & Spencer, S. J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance. Journal of Personality  
and Social Psychology, 73, 31-44. 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117-141.  
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of prison. (A. Sheridan, Trans.). New  
York: Random House Inc. 
                                                                                                                                        41
Frazer, J. G. (2002). The golden bough (Abridged ed.). New York: Macmillan. (Original work  
published 1922).  
Freud, S. (1957). Instincts and their vicissitudes. In J. Rickman (Ed.), A general selection from  
the works of Sigmund Freud. New York: Liveright. (Original work published 1915) 
Freud, A. (1936). The ego and the mechanisms of defense. London: Hogarth. 
Govorun, O., Fuegen, K., &Payne, B. K. (2005). The effect of projection on self-ratings.  
Unpublished raw data. 
Govorun, O., Fuegen, K., &Payne, B. K. (2006). Stereotypes focus defensive projection.  
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32781-793. 
Haidt, J., Koller, S. H., & Dias, M. G. (1993). Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat  
your dog? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 613–628. 
Halpern, J. (1977). Projection: A test of the psychoanalytic hypothesis. Journal of Abnormal  
Psychology, 86, 536-542. 
Holmes, D. S. (1968). Dimensions of projection. Psychological Bulletin, 69, 248-268. 
Holmes, D. S. (1978). Projection as a defense mechanism. Psychological Bulletin, 85, 677-688. 
Holmes, D. S., & Houston, B. K. (1971). The defensive function of projection. Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology, 20, 208-213. 
Inbar, Y., Pizzaro, D. A., Gilovich, T., & Ariely, D. (2013). Moral masochism: On the  
connection between guilt and self-punishment. Emotion, 13, 14-18. 
 Jung, C. G. (1968). Analytical psychology: Its theory and practice (The tavistock lectures). New  
York: Pantheon. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge  
                                                                                                                                        42
to Western thought. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Landau, M. J., Meier, B. P., & Keefer, L. K. (2010) A metaphor-enriched social cognition.  
Psychology bulletin, 136, 1045-1067. 
Leach, C. W., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2007). Group virtue: The importance of morality (vs.  
competence and sociability) in the positive evaluation of in-groups. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 2 4-249. 
Lee, S. W. S., & Schwarz, N. (2010). Dirty hands and dirty mouths: Embodiment of the moral- 
purity metaphor is specific to the motor modality involved in moral transgression. 
Psychological Science, 21, 423–1425. 
Lee, S. W. S., & Schwarz, N. (2011). Wiping the slate clean: Psychological consequences of  
physical cleansing. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 203 7-311. 
Lee, S. W. S., & Schwarz, N., (2012). Bidirectionality, mediation, and moderation of  
metaphorical effects: The embodiment of social suspicion and fishy smells. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 103, 7 7-749. 
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum. 
Merritt, A. C., Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Moral self-licensing: When being good frees  
us to be bad. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4, 344–357. 
Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, Moll, F.T., Ignacio, F.A., Bramati, I.E., Caparelli-Daquer, E.M., 
et al. (2005). The moral affiliations of disgust. Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, 18, 
68–78. 
Nelissen, R. M. A., & Zeelenberg, M. (2009). When guilt evokes self-punishment: Evidence for  
the existence of a Dobby effect. Emotion, 9, 118–122. 
Newman, L. S., Duff, K. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (1997). A new look at defensive projection:  
                                                                                                                                        43
Thought suppression, accessibility, and biased person perception. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 72, 980-1001. 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and  
comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 40, 
879–891. 
Regan, D. T., Williams, M., & Sparling, S. (1972). Voluntary expiation of guilt: A field  
experiment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24  42–45. 
Ricoeur, P. (1967). The symbolism of evil. New York: Beacon Press. 
Rothschild, Z. K., Landau, M. J., Molina, L. E.,  Branscombe, N. R., & Sullivan, D. (in press).  
Displacing blame over the ingroup’s harming of a disa vantaged group can fuel moral 
outrage at a third-party scapegoat. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 
Rozin, P., Lowery, L., & Ebert, R. (1994). Varieties of disgust faces and the structure of disgust.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66870–881. 
Rozin, P., Markwith, M., & McCauley, C. (1994). Sensitivity to indirect contacts with other  
persons: AIDS aversion as a composite of aversion to strangers, infection, moral taint and 
misfortune. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103, 495-504. 
Schimel, J., Greenberg, J., & Martens, A. (2003). Evidence that projection of a feared trait can  
serve a defensive function. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 969-979. 
Schnall, S., Benton, J., & Harvey, S. (2008). With a clean conscience: Cleanliness reduces the  
severity of moral judgments. Psychological Science, 19, 1219–1222. 
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as embodied moral judgment.  
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 341096–1109. 
Tomarken, A. J. & Serlin, R. C. (1986). Comparison of ANOVA alternatives under variance  
                                                                                                                                        44
heterogeneity and specific noncentrality structures. Psychological Bulletin, 99, 90-99. 
Victor, G. (2003). Scapegoating—A ritual of purification. Journal of Psychohistory, 30, 3, 271- 
288. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures  
of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social  
Psychology, 54, 1063–1070. 
Wegner, D. M. (1992). You can’t always think what you want: Problems in the suppression of  
unwanted thoughts. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 
25, pp. 193-225). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Wills, T. A. (1981). Downward comparison principles in social psychology. Psychological  
Bulletin, 90, 245-271. 
Zhong, C. B., & Liljenquist, K. A. (2006). Washing away your sins: Threatened morality and  
physical cleansing. Science, 313, 1451–1452. 
Zhong, C. B., Strejcek, B., & Sivanathan, N. (2010). A clean self can render harsh moral  
judgment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 859–862. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        45
 
Footnotes 
1. It is also worth noting that these findings provide what is, to our knowledge, the most 
direct evidence to date that people can feel soiled by their own moral violations. Zhong and 
Liljenquist (2006) indirectly assessing participant’s felt physical contamination by measuring the 
accessibility of cleaning-related words (Study 1), or willingness to pay more for cleaning 
products (Study 2). The current study directly asses ed participants’ self-reported feelings of 
personal physical cleanliness. 
 
2. Data for 11 participants was excluded from all analyses for failing to correctly identify 
that the new article described a hit-and-run car accident.  
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Table 1 
Ratings of target as “evil” and “dirty” as a function of target type (Supplemental Study) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                                              
Target Type                                                                          Evil                      Dirty 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Non-Transgressor                                                                  2.78a (1.39)           2.81a (1.36) 
 
Non-Punished Transgressor                                        3.95b (1.33)           3.84b (1.54) 
 
Punished Transgressor                                                           2.87a (1.34)          2.98a (1.22)                                                                       
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. Scale ranged from 1 to 6, with higher scores indicating descriptor was more characteristic 
of transgressor target. Means that do not share a subscript within the same column differ at p ≤ 
.05. 
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Table 2 
 
Reported interest in joining blood drive as a function of personal immorality salience and target 
type (Study 2) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                       
                  Personal Immorality Salience 
 
                                      Immorality Salient                                     Immorality Not Salient 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                  
Target Type                  
                                     No                 Yes                                      No                    Yes 
                                        ____________________          ____________________                                            ____________________                ____________________ 
    
Non-punished          10 (48%)              11 (52%)                           16 (76%)           5 (24%) 
Transgressor            
           
Punished                  19 (86%)                3 (14%)                           15 (65%)           8 (35%) 
Transgressor             
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 1. Ratings of personal physical cleanliness as a functio  of personal immorality salience 
and target type (Study 1). 
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                                                       Total Effect: β = .28** 
                                                       Direct Effect: β = .19 n.s. 
 
 
Note: Total adjusted R2 for the model = .10, F(2, 84) = 6.00, p = .004. All path coefficients 
represent standardized regression weights. The direct effect coefficient represents the effect of 
personal immorality salience on the dependent variable fter controlling for the effect of the 
proposed mediator. 
 
* p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
Figure 2. Indirect effect of personal immorality salience on perceived physical dirtiness of target 
transgressor through feelings of personal guilt (Study 2). 
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Figure 3. Ratings of personal morality relative to other students as a function of personal 
immorality salience and target type (Study 2). 
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Figure 4. Odds ratios of reported interest in joining a blood drive as a function of personal 
immorality salience and target type (Study 2). 
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Appendix A 
 
Personal immorality salience primes used in Studies 1 and 2 
 
 
Take a few moments to recall a time when you acted in an unethical way. This should be an 
action that you committed at least a year ago, but after your childhood.  
 
Rather than think of a trivial action, think about a personally significant action.  
In the space below, write about this time. Describe how you acted unethically, what the 
consequences of your actions were, and how it made you feel about yourself. Your personal, 
honest responses are appreciated, and will be kept completely confidential. Continue writing 
until the computer presents you with the next task.  
 
Writing prompt for personal immorality salient condition  
 
 
 
 
 
Take a few moments to recall a time when you were vy bored. This should be a time that 
happened at least a year ago, but after your childhoo .  
 
In the space below, write about this time. Describe what the situation was like, how it made you 
feel about yourself, and what actions you took. Your personal, honest responses are appreciated, 
and will be kept completely confidential. Continue writing until the computer presents you with 
the next task.  
 
Writing prompt for personal immorality-not-salient condition  
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Appendix B 
 
Student misconduct report, case description seen by all participants (Study 1) 
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Appendix C 
 
Target type manipulation (Study 1) 
 
 
Non-transgressor condition 
 
 
Non-punished transgressor condition 
 
 
Punished transgressor condition 
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Appendix D 
 
Article introducing target transgressor (Study 2) 
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Appendix E 
 
Target type manipulation (Study 2) 
 
  
 
 
Article used in non-punished transgressor condition  
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Article used in punished transgressor condition 
